Equity ownership in cross-border mergers and acquisitions by British firms: an analysis of real options and transaction cost factors by Ahammad, Mohammad et al.
Equity ownership in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions by British firms: an analysis of real options 
and transaction cost factors
AHAMMAD, Mohammad <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0271-2223>, LEONE, 
Vitor, TARBA, Shlomo, KEITH, Glaister and AHMAD, Arslan
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/15297/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
AHAMMAD, Mohammad, LEONE, Vitor, TARBA, Shlomo, KEITH, Glaister and 
AHMAD, Arslan (2017). Equity ownership in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
by British firms: an analysis of real options and transaction cost factors. British 
Journal Of Management, 28 (2), 180-196. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
1 
 
Equity Ownership in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by British 
Firms: An Analysis of Real Options and Transaction Cost Factors 
 
British Journal of Management 
Accepted Manuscript 
 
Mohammad F. Ahammad  
Reader (Associate Professor) in Strategy & International Business 
IBERG, Sheffield Business School 
Sheffield Hallam University, UK 
raselengland@yahoo.com 
 
Vitor Leone 
Senior Lecturer in Banking and Finance 
Leicester Castle Business School 
De Montfort University, UK 
vitor.leone@dmu.ac.uk 
 
Shlomo Y. Tarba 
Reader (Associate Professor) in Business Strategy 
Head of Department of Strategy & International Business 
Birmingham Business School 
University of Birmingham, UK 
s.tarba@bham.ac.uk     
 
Keith W. Glaister 
Professor & Associate Dean 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick, UK 
keith.glaister@wbs.ac.uk 
 
Ahmad Arslan 
Senior Lecturer in International Business 
Business School 
Edge Hill University, UK  
arslana@edgehill.ac.uk  
 
2 
 
Equity Ownership in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by British 
Firms: An Analysis of Real Options and Transaction Cost Factors 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the factors influencing the share of equity ownership sought in cross border 
mergers and acquisitions (CB M&As). Drawing on real options theory and transaction cost 
economics (TCE), we address and hypothesize key factors linked to commitment under 
exogenous uncertainty and the separation of desired and non-desired assets’ influence on 
share of equity sought by acquiring firms in CB M&As. Empirical analysis based on 1872 
CB M&As undertaken by British firms in both developed and emerging economies show that 
British MNEs are more likely to pursue a partial acquisition in a target foreign firm when 
those foreign firms are from culturally distant countries. Further, findings support the view 
that the high cost of separating desired assets from non-desired assets motivates firms to 
make a partial acquisition rather than acquire the target completely. This is one of the first 
studies to use real options theory to address the cost of commitment under exogenous 
uncertainty, as well as TCE logic to address the separation of desired and non-desired assets 
in the target firm, while analysing equity ownership sought in CBM&As. Empirically, our 
paper contributes by examining CBM&As by British firms in both developed and emerging 
markets.  
 
Keywords: Cross-border M&As, equity ownership, uncertainty, cultural distance, British 
firms   
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INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CB M&As) are increasingly being used as a foreign 
market entry strategy by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to create and penetrate new 
markets, gain synergy benefits, facilitate portfolio diversification, access technological assets 
and reduce taxation (Arslan et al. 2015; Junni et al., 2015; Pablo and Javidan, 2009). In 2014, 
the total value of CB M&As reached approximately US$384 billion (UNCTAD, 2015). 
During the first three quarters of 2014, the value of M&As involving British firms reached 
approximately £11 billion (ONS, 2014). Due to their increased global prevalence, CB M&As 
are clearly important for international business (IB) scholars to better understand.  
It has been established in prior literature that CBM&As are risky (Shimizu et al., 2004; Hitt 
and Pisano, 2009) and their failure rates are relatively high (e.g. Erez-Rein et al., 2009). 
Moreover, when MNEs acquire foreign target firms, they tend to face significant challenges 
due to differences in institutional environments (Dikova et al., 2010) and cultures (Dikova 
and Sahib, 2013) between home and host countries. Some prior IB studies have suggested 
that alignment in goals of acquiring MNE and target firm can reduce problems associated 
with the management of CB M&As (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Chen, 2008; Das and 
Kapil, 2012). In this context, we contend that the equity ownership in CBM&As is an aspect 
that can help to align the goals of acquiring MNE and target firm, as well as reduce the 
difficulties associated with post CB M&A management. This is especially the case when both 
acquired and acquirer firms see ownership structure as a mechanism to reduce uncertainties 
associated with the external environment.  
An MNE may acquire 100 percent share capital or equity of the target firm. A full acquisition 
transfers the ownership and control of the target firm to the acquiring firm. However, an 
MNE may partially acquire the target firm. Partial acquisition is a form of acquisition where 
an acquiring firm purchases an equity stake or part of the share capital in the foreign 
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organization (Jakobsen and Meyer, 2008). For instance, Ogilvy and Mather Worldwide, a 
unit of WPP Group PLC in the UK, acquired a 40% equity in Empresa Tecnica de 
Communicacao, a provider of marketing and advertising services in Brazil, for US$18.83 
million in 2004. Thus, we observe several partial CB M&As, rather than all CB M&As being 
fully owned.  
A limited literature (e.g. Chari and Chang, 2009; Arslan and Larimo, 2012) has examined 
ownership choice in CBM&As, specifically by distinguishing between full acquisitions and 
partial acquisitions. The ownership choice in CB M&As specifically has been ignored in 
most previous market entry studies due to the tendency to analyze both full and partial CB 
M&As together in the case of general establishment mode (greenfield investment vs. 
acquisition) and ownership mode (wholly owned vs. partially owned subsidiaries) focused 
analysis (Chen and Hennart, 2004; Arslan and Larimo, 2012). Therefore, our paper aims to 
develop new insights by analyzing factors influencing MNEs’ choice between full and partial 
CBM&As. 
Our paper extends the work of Chari and Chang (2009). First, unlike Chari and Chang 
(2009), our paper examines CBM&As by British firms in both developed and emerging 
markets. Therefore, our study sample is more heterogeneous, and findings are more 
generalizable. Second, Chari and Chang (2009) examined two dimensions of Hofstede’s 
national cultural index i.e. uncertainty avoidance and individualism. In contrast, we examine 
four dimensions of the GLOBE Project’s national cultural index i.e. uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism. Third, Chari and Chang 
(2009) argue that uncertainty avoidance is a more powerful determinant than other 
dimensions of culture in explaining the ownership choice in CB M&A. However, we found 
that uncertainty avoidance has no significant impact on the choice between partial and full 
acquisitions. Our finding tends to suggest that British MNEs are more likely to choose a 
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partial acquisition in the foreign target firm in the face of high institutional collectivism 
distance.  
The empirical context of our paper further enriches the literature in several ways. Firstly, 
prior studies analyzing ownership structure have concentrated on CBM&As undertaken in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Jakobsen and Meyer, 2008), Japanese CB M&As (Chen and 
Hennart, 2004), and American CB M&As in developed countries (Chari and Chang, 2009). 
Prior work has found that ownership preferences vary between US firms and those from other 
countries (Erramilli, 1996), consequently, new research is required examining the factors 
influencing ownership choice in a non-US context. We argue that despite some similarities 
between US MNEs and British MNEs, British MNEs differ from US MNEs in terms of pre-
and post-M&A management practices. For instance, British and American buyers differ in 
some of the control mechanisms they exercise over acquired firms, with these practices being 
in line with their respective administrative and national heritage (Calori, Lubatkin and Very, 
1994, p.373). Further, Calori et al. (1994) found British management to be very 'hands-off', 
with tremendous faith placed in the quality of the acquired local management. In contrast, US 
management style is more “hands-on”. Unlike Chari and Chang (2009), our paper focuses on 
British MNEs’ choice between full and partial acquisitions. Thus, our paper contributes in the 
British context. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background 
A review of extant IB literature reveals that very few studies (see e.g. Chen and Hennart, 
2004; Jakobsen and Meyer, 2008; Chari and Chang, 2009; Arslan and Larimo, 2012) have 
analyzed ownership choice in CBM&As specifically by distinguishing between full 
acquisitions and partial acquisitions. Hence, this phenomenon is under-researched, compared 
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to general establishment and ownership decisions which have been widely researched (e.g. 
Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). CB M&As as an entry strategy can offer investing MNEs 
instant access to valuable and complementary resources and capabilities residing in the target 
foreign firms (Hennart, 2009). Thus, these MNEs own, control and leverage the combined 
asset-base to realize economies of scale and scope, and can enhance their competitive 
positioning regarding local and international rivals (Chen and Hennart, 2004; Chen, 2008; 
Hennart, 2009). Hence, CBM&As emerge as a preferred entry strategy by investing MNEs to 
gain a foothold in the foreign market relatively quickly (Arslan and Larimo, 2012). 
These unique features concerning CB M&As specifically have been ignored in most previous 
market entry studies due to the tendency to analyze together both full and partial CB M&As 
in the case of general establishment mode (greenfield investment vs. acquisition) and 
ownership mode (wholly owned vs. partially owned subsidiaries) focused analysis (Chen and 
Hennart, 2004; Arslan and Larimo, 2012). Therefore, our paper aims to develop new insights 
by analyzing factors influencing MNEs’ choice between full and partial CBM&As. 
We address different aspects of uncertainty (Slangen and van Tulder, 2009; Dikova et al., 
2010; Slangen, 2011) associated with foreign market entry, especially in the context of 
CBM&As. Our key theoretical arguments are based on real options theory (Miller and Folta, 
2002; Driouchi and Bannett, 2012) and TCE (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991, 
2009; Hennart and Park, 1993) in the context of CB M&As. The real options approach to 
equity commitment in the form of acquisitions complements the leading theories of MNE 
strategies and provides a framework to explore the effect of uncertainty on expansion choices 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Li and Rugman, 2007; Brouthers et al., 2008; Wooster et al., 2016). 
The real options approach argues that toehold operations, such as partial acquisitions, permit 
MNEs to defer large strategic investments (Majd and Pindyck, 1987). In a real options 
context, higher investment risk increases the value of adopting lower equity investments 
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while waiting for the resolution of uncertainty (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Rivoli and 
Salorio, 1996). This flexibility is echoed in the choice of entry mode which gives managers 
the capability to respond to uncertainty as it is revealed and is enhanced through experiential 
learning (Wooster et al., 2016). 
Our theoretical contribution comes from being one of the first studies to use real options 
theory to address the cost of commitment under exogenous uncertainty, as well as TCE logic 
to address the separation of desired and non-desired assets in the target firm, while analysing 
equity ownership sought in CB M&As. We extend the work on uncertainty by treating 
uncertainty as a multifaceted variable (Milikien, 1987; Liu and Almor, 2016) rather than a 
single factor as assumed in many prior IB studies. We address exogenous uncertainty using 
the concepts of country risk, level of CB M&A activity and cultural distance. Further, in the 
empirical analysis, we operationalize uncertainty caused by cultural distance by using the 
GLOBE dimensions, and test the influence of those dimensions individually rather than using 
a single aggregate construct, thereby empirically extending Milliken’s (1987) work in that 
context. Consequently, we contribute to the emerging discussion in CB M&A literature, 
where the target firm’s level of maturity manifested by size has been referred to as a key 
factor for success (e.g. Brueller, Ellis, Segev, and Carmeli, 2015).  
M&As by British firms provide an excellent context to examine the factors influencing the 
ownership choice in CBM&A. British firms continue to play an important role in global 
M&A deal making. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), in 2015 there were 
a total of 136 acquisitions of foreign companies made by British companies, compared with 
113 acquisitions recorded in 2014. The 136 outward acquisitions completed in 2015, were 
made mainly in Europe (44%) and the Americas (43%) followed by Asia and rest of the 
world (13%). Thus, British companies typically look to Western Europe and the United 
States when seeking targets, typifying cultural and language synergies that some firms feel 
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comfortable with. However, a growing number of cross border M&A deals by British firms is 
also carried out in emerging markets. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Cost of Commitment under Exogenous Uncertainty and Real Options 
Entry into foreign markets often involves dealing with exogenous uncertainty, the resolution 
of which is not affected by firms’ actions (Cuypers and Martin, 2010). Exogenous uncertainty 
has been addressed in previous literature as a state in which one cannot determine the 
probability of an outcome, owing to a lack of information about external factors (Miller and 
Shamsie 1999). In the context of organizations and their strategies, uncertainty can be 
referred to as the ‘inability to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant data’ or ‘perceived 
inability to predict’ (Milliken, 1987) due to unpredictability associated with different 
dimensions of external economic activity which cannot be manipulated by a single firm 
(Miller and Reuer, 1998: Brouthers and Dikova, 2010).   
Exogenous uncertainty has been used as a key explanatory variable in foreign market entry 
studies using real options theory (see e.g.  Delios and Henisz, 2003: Brouthers and Dikova, 
2010: Cuypers and Martin, 2010). The real options approach to equity commitment in the 
form of wholly owned subsidiaries, acquisitions and greenfield operations, complements the 
leading theories of MNE strategies and provides a natural framework to explore the effect of 
uncertainty on expansion choices (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Li and Rugman, 2007; Brouthers et 
al., 2008). Incremental investments allow firms to defer part of the investment but gain 
experience in the market, gather market-specific knowledge, and possibly establish a brand 
image which can provide a growth option (Kogut, 1991). Therefore, we observe that in prior 
literature, joint ventures (JVs) have been referred to as a real option that provides a platform 
to expand and acquire (or exit) upon the resolution of exogenous uncertainty (e.g. Cuypers 
and Martin, 2010; Tong, Reuer, and Peng, 2008).  In a recent study, Li and Li (2010) noted 
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that under a high level of exogenous uncertainty, MNEs choose a lower-equity entry mode 
rather than higher-equity entry mode. Similarly, Cuypers and Martin (2010) found that there 
is a negative relationship between the equity share of investing foreign firms in JVs and 
exogenous uncertainty. Hence, foreign firms reduce their equity commitments when they face 
high exogenous uncertainty.   
We argue that partial acquisitions can also serve the same purpose of economizing on the cost 
of resource commitment while the foreign firm waits to see how the exogenous uncertainty 
resolves. Moreover, a decision to exit a partial acquisition position, if the uncertainty resolves 
unfavourably, can be made without the inter-partner negotiations that complicate exit in JVs 
(Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1994). Country risk – specifically economic, 
financial, and political risk – has been referred to as a primary source of exogenous 
uncertainty in previous studies (e.g. Cuypers and Martin, 2010; Brouthers et al., 2008: Li and 
Li, 2010). Following Milliken (1987), country risk can be categorized as state uncertainty and 
leads to managers finding this unpredictability influencing their business strategies 
significantly. We argue based on real options theory that British firms when facing high 
country risk will tend to pursue opportunities that have significant upside potential in a 
manner that would allow them to contain the associated risk (McGrath, Ferrier and 
Mendelow, 2004). A lower share of equity in foreign target firms would enable British MNEs 
to align their interests with powerful foreign stakeholders (Meyer, 2002; Jakobsen and 
Meyer, 2008), as well as offer potential for future growth (in the form of full acquisition), 
when conditions of risk and uncertainty are contained (Chen and Hennart, 2004; Chen, 2008). 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 1: British MNEs will seek a lower share of equity in foreign target firms when 
those firms are from countries with higher country risk than when they are 
from countries with lower country risk. 
 
The real options literature suggests that the value of making a smaller commitment to secure 
an option to expand or exit in future is also related to the duration in time for which the firm 
could wait before deciding to expand or exit (Miller and Folta, 2002). However, there is a 
threat for such firms that while they are waiting, their competitors can pre-empt and attain 
strategic advantage in that specific context. MacMillan (1983) was one of the first authors to 
identify pre-emptive strategies in a business-related context and refers to it as “A major move 
by a focal business ahead of moves by its adversaries, which allows it to secure an 
advantageous position from which it is difficult to dislodge because of the advantages it has 
captured by being the first mover” (p.16). Pre-emption can play a crucial role in choice of 
equity share of the foreign firm. If the rivals pre-empt market entry of the focal firms, it will 
lead to reduction in the time window and thereby also reduces the relative value of flexibility 
offered by lower ownership compared with commitment represented by higher ownership 
(Miller and Folta, 2002). Conversely, lower risk of pre-emption caused by fewer rivals can 
allow the investing firm to use the low-commitment alternative of acquiring partial equity 
stakes in incumbent firms rather than outright acquisitions (Folta, 1998). Matching the 
country market presence of rivals, particularly in markets considered attractive, is critical to 
secure relative global competitiveness for MNEs (Hamel and Prahalad, 1985). In a similar 
vein, Brouthers et al. (2008) refer to strategic flexibility of investing firms as a key 
determinant of equity share in foreign market entry decisions. This strategic flexibility can be 
strengthened by investing firms’ previous experience in evaluating risks and undertaking 
similar ventures (Fisch, 2006).  
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The level of CB M&A activity varies across countries, suggesting relative attractiveness of 
the market for acquisitions by both local and foreign firms (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007). CB 
M&A activity has elements of effect and response uncertainty (Mlliken, 1987; Liu and 
Almor, 2016), as managers are knowledgeable about it, but cannot predict exact influences on 
their business. Therefore, it tends to lead to pre-emotive behaviour by those managers due to 
different dynamics associated with either high or low CB M&A activity.  Prior literature also 
suggests that MNEs engaging in CB M&As typically have to collect, analyse, distribute and 
utilize information about the foreign target firms, as well as the overall CBM&A market 
(Very and Schweiger 2001). The markets with high CBM&A activity are expected to have 
more firms that potentially can be acquired by MNEs (Hennart and Park, 1993). This also 
means that competitors can spot suitable acquisition targets, and identify skilled foreign 
advisors to assist them in due diligence (Aybar and Ficici 2009).  Hence, the risk of pre-
emption by competitors can force investing British MNEs to seek more equity in attractive 
foreign target firms in such economies, so that their competitors can not hinder their strategic 
plans by bidding for the same firms. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: British MNEs will seek a greater share of equity in foreign target firms when 
those firms are from countries experiencing greater levels of CB M&A activity 
than when they are from countries experiencing lower levels of CB M&A 
activity. 
 
Integrating Target Firm Managers in Culturally Distant Countries 
Cultural distance has a vital and multi-faceted role in cross border mergers and acquisitions 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Reus and Lamont, 2009; Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Dikova et al., 2010; 
Weber et al., 2011; Ahammad, et al. 2016). By entering a culturally different foreign market, 
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firms are exposed to diverse social routines and implicit assumptions that may appear 
unfamiliar and challenging (Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Hofstede, 1980). Cultural distance has 
elements of effect uncertainty (Mlliken, 1987; Liu and Almor, 2016), as managers are 
knowledge about some potential influences but not all of them. Earlier literature shows that 
the presence of high cultural distance may escalate the firm’s challenges to effectively 
manage relationships with stakeholders of the target firm, owing to differences in value 
systems, beliefs, and attitudes of organizational actors (Contractor et al., 2014). Conversely, 
low cultural distance may reduce the above challenges considerably. Kogut and Singh (1988) 
argued that managers in local target firms are expected to be able to better manage 
relationships with the local stakeholders, and hence MNEs may prefer to entrust local 
management responsibilities to local managers. Accordingly, an acquirer is expected to 
require the ongoing presence of managers of the local target firm for an extended period 
following its acquisition (Chi, 1994). Therefore, the acquiring firm may opt for a partial 
acquisition in a culturally distant country and may retain the managers of the foreign target 
firm. 
Partial acquisition may bring several benefits to British acquiring firms. First, by choosing a 
partial acquisition, acquirers may obtain a “hostage effect” that should assist them in both ex-
ante due diligence of foreign target firms and ex-post enforcement of contracts (Chen and 
Hennart, 2004). Target firms that consent to entertain a partial M&A deal signal their self-
belief in the prospects of their organisation (Chen and Hennart, 2004), which in turn helps 
reduce the British acquirer's ex ante costs of screening the foreign target firms. Since 
managers of the foreign target firm have some form of stake (e.g. profit sharing in the target 
firm), foreign target firm managers are expected to be more prepared to pass on their tacit 
knowledge of the firm (Chen and Hennart, 2004) and knowledge of the host country's market 
to the managers of the acquiring firm (Chari and Chang, 2009; Slangen and van Tulder, 
13 
 
2009). Consequently, the acquiring firm is likely to realize the full potential of the acquisition 
(Chari and Chang, 2009). Chari and Chang (2009) argued that greater cultural distance 
related to an inclination for partial acquisitions relative to full acquisitions. This line of 
argument indicates that, as cultural distance increases, British MNEs will seek a lower share 
of equity in foreign target firms, and cede a correspondingly greater share of ownership to the 
foreign target firm to preserve incentives for target firm managers and to obtain their support 
in transferring tacit assets. Based on the above discussion, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: British MNEs will seek a lower share of equity in foreign target firms when 
those firms are from culturally distant countries than when they are from 
culturally closer countries. 
 
Separating Desired Assets and Non-Desired Assets 
One of the main reasons for MNEs to engage in CBM&A activity is to gain access to certain 
assets that are valuable for MNEs in the market (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007; Hitt and 
Pisano, 2009). However, the desired assets come with a set of undesired assets, which the 
acquiring firm will be keen to remove. Separating desired assets from non-desired assets 
involves restructuring employee contracts and workforce layoffs (Hitt et al., 2001; Estrin et 
al., 2009). It is important to note that effective recombination of resources and assets can lead 
to new ownership advantages for MNEs (Collinson and Narula, 2014). However, a key aspect 
that needs to be considered by acquiring MNEs in this context relates to employees and their 
integration after restructuring (e.g. Galpin and Herndon, 2014). This aspect can significantly 
influence the MNE’s need to separate desired and non-desired assets.  The cost of 
employment restructuring is closely related to labour and employment laws, which vary 
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across countries (Jackson and Miyajima, 2007). In an extensive study, Botero et al. (2004) 
found that employment laws varied across the 85 countries they surveyed in terms of the 
various attributes that make employment contracts rigid and costly to terminate or restructure, 
including the existence of alternative employment contracts, the cost of increasing hours 
worked, the cost of firing workers, and dismissal procedures.  
Prior research has also revealed that gains associated with acquisitions are relatively higher in 
the liberal market economies of the USA and the UK, compared to France and Germany, 
because of the possibilities of corporate restructuring and the rationalization of costs via 
reducing employment (Conyon et al., 2001; Jackson, 2005). The above arguments suggest 
that when the cost of restructuring employment contracts is high, the cost of separating 
desired assets from the rest of the foreign target firm is likely to be high, lowering potential 
gains from a full acquisition and rendering partial ownership to support exchange with the 
target firm correspondingly more attractive. Greater employment contract rigidity is also 
likely to affect the share of equity acquired by British MNEs. Employment contract rigidity 
has been shown to lower productivity and negatively influence performance of firms, 
especially in the long run (Batra et al., 2003; Kruppe et al., 2013). In such a case, British 
MNEs which are driven by profit seeking motives primarily, are likely to limit their 
commitment to such foreign target firms by acquiring a smaller share of equity for market 
entry. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4: British MNEs will seek a lower share of equity in foreign target firms when 
those firms are from countries with greater employment contract rigidity than 
when they are from countries with less employment contract rigidity. 
 
Target Firm Size 
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The size of the target firm has been an important variable used in many past IB and 
management studies because it represents availability of resources and assets (e.g. 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Oh et al., 2014; Erel et al., 2015).  According to transaction cost 
logic, the size of the target firm presents an important dilemma for the investing MNE, as its 
interests lie in the separation of desired assets from undesired ones, and achieving synergy 
relatively quickly (Verbeke and Hillemann, 2013; Erel et al., 2015). However, a large size 
target firm may lead to higher costs of post M&A integration (e.g. Brar et al., 2009; Das and 
Teng, 2000; Oh et al., 2014). The main sources of these extra costs in the case of large size 
target firm are: a) the cost of acquiring the target firm in its entirety so that the foreign firm 
can exercise its hierarchical authority to separate the desired assets from undesired ones (Oh 
et al., 2014; Feliciano and Lipsey, 2015); b) the cost of restructuring the target firm to 
separate desired assets from non-desired assets (e.g. Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Maksimovic 
et al., 2011; Erel et al., 2015); c) the cost of selling the non-desired assets of the target firm – 
including search and negotiation costs (e.g. Krishnan, et al., 2007; Feliciano and Lipsey, 
2015). 
Therefore, the cost of separating desired assets from non-desired assets is likely to be greater 
in larger target firms than in smaller target firms (e.g. Maksimovic et al., 2011; Feliciano and 
Lipsey, 2015). This is because the costs of acquisition, restructuring, and post-separation sale 
of non-desired assets are all likely to be greater for larger targets (Verbeke and Hillemann, 
2013; Feliciano and Lipsey, 2015). Thus, we argue that British MNEs are more likely to opt 
out of complete acquisitions in favour of partial stakes to support exchange in larger foreign 
target firms. Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5: British MNEs will seek a lower share of equity in foreign target firms when 
those firms are larger in size than when they are smaller in size. 
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METHODS 
We obtained a sample of cross border acquisitions announced by British firms during the 
years 2002-2007 from the Thomson One Banker Database. We narrowed the sample for the 
study by dropping observations where the acquirer had a prior equity interest in the target 
firm, since these acquisitions are not comparable to fresh acquisitions in terms of the 
acquirer’s familiarity with the target firm. In addition, to control for the possibility that the 
shares of equity sought were dictated by government policy, we dropped observations where 
country regulations restricted foreign ownership. Finally, we examined all cross-border 
acquisition by firms from the financial services sector (Standard Industry Classification - SIC 
6 series) and eliminated deals that were made for portfolio investment purposes. The 
selection process yielded a net sample of 1872 cross border acquisition deals by 1251 British 
firms.  
The use of 2002-2007 sample was chosen to mitigate the impact of economic, financial and 
political events on the analysis, such as, the global financial crises (GFC), Greek sovereign 
debt and war in Syria. Cerrato et al. (2015) argue that economic and financial adversity such 
as the GFC can result in substantial changes in the external environment of companies. The 
adversities in the financial market may cause a reduction in capital available to firms, 
creating barriers to obtain sufficient resources for working capital and debt service 
obligations. We follow the argument of Cerrato et al. (2015) who state that companies when 
confronted with economic crisis, even when taking risky actions, tend to focus on local 
markets and reduce or rule out cross border activities to avoid excessive risk taking that may 
impair the business survival. Thus, firms are unlikely to engage in acquisitions at all. 
We present some evidence of this strategic risk avoidance behaviour adopted by firms in 
Figure 1. On average from 2001 to 2007, 342 cross-border acquisitions were completed by 
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UK companies, in contrast from 2008 to 2015 the mean number was substantially reduced to 
166 or almost 52% less CB M&A activity. 
Figure 1: Trends in CB M&A by UK (2001-2015)
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
Table 1 provides a summary of the sample by industry sector. Consumer products and 
services, financials, high technology, industrials, materials and, media and entertainment 
were among the most active target industries. 
Table 1: Number of CB M&As in the sample by industry 
Industry classifications Number of deals Percentage 
Financials 384 20.50% 
High Technology 239 12.76% 
Consumer Products and Services 221 11.80% 
Materials 201 10.73% 
Media and Entertainment 170 9.08% 
Industrials 153 8.17% 
Energy and Power 125 6.67% 
Consumer Staples 106 5.66% 
Healthcare 106 5.66% 
Real Estate 90 4.81% 
Telecommunications 43 2.30% 
Retail 35 1.87% 
Total 1873 100% 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the sample by target country. As shown in Table 2, CB 
M&As in the sample involved several target countries, with the USA accounting for the most 
(557) acquisitions followed by Australia (165), Germany (154) and France (150).  
Table 2: Number of CB M&As in the sample by target country 
Country Number of deals Percentage 
USA 557 29.74% 
Australia 165 8.81% 
Germany 154 8.22% 
France 150 8.01% 
Canada 87 4.64% 
Spain 82 4.38% 
Netherlands 67 3.58% 
Italy 62 3.31% 
Sweden 56 2.99% 
BRICS 149 7.96% 
Rest of Europe 170 9.08% 
Rest of Asia 105 5.61% 
Others 69 3.68% 
 
The share of equity sought by the acquirer ranged from 2.2% to 100%, with a mean of 86.2% 
and a fairly large standard deviation of 28%.  In 1439 of the 1873 cases the share of equity 
sought was 100%, and in 434 cases (about 13.8% of the sample) acquirers sought less than 
100% equity. Compared to Chari and Chang (2009) who investigated similar issues for the 
USA, our study presents a much higher number of cross-border acquisitions and the reverse 
effect in relation to the preferred market for the British acquirers (USA acquirers in Chari and 
Chang (2009) predominantly chose the UK) that is the high incidence of complete ownership 
sought is very much consistent with prior research that has noted US firms’ predominant 
preference for full ownership and maximum control over foreign operations (Erramilli & 
Rao, 1993).  
The Model 
19 
 
To test which factors are relevant in determining the choice of equity share in cross-border 
acquisitions, the following general model is estimated. 
















 (Controls)
Firm Local Target of Value Market
Contract Employment Risk Country
Avoidance yUncertaint Distance Cultural
Distance Power Distance Cultural
smCollectivi Group-In Distance Cultural
smCollectivi nalInstitutio Distance Cultural
Country Target the in Activity CBA of Level  sought equity of Share
7
6
5
4
3
2
n8
1
(1) 
Since our dependent variable, percentage of equity sought, is delimited between values equal 
to and less than 100%, we coded these values using a binary choice with 0 representing 
acquisitions of less than 100%, and 1 representing full acquisition or 100%. The implication 
is that if the dependent variable is set-up as a 0-1 dummy variable and regressed on a set of 
explanatory variables, we would expect the predicted values of the dependent variable, in our 
case percentage of equity sought, to fall mainly within the interval between 0 and 1. This 
suggests that the predicted value of the dependent variable could be interpreted as the 
probability that an acquirer will proceed with the cross-border acquisition given the values of 
the explanatory variables for that acquirer. This sort of approach gives its name to a class of 
limited dependent variable econometric methods defined as Linear Probability Models, often 
referred as Probit/Logit models and its variations (Kennedy, 2013).   
In addition, samples with limited dependent variables can be classified into two general 
categories, censored and truncated. Censored or truncated variables occur when the range of 
values observable for the dependent variables is limited for some reason (100% acquisition). 
For both censored and truncated data (Brooks, 2014), OLS will not be appropriate, and an 
approach based on maximum likelihood must be used. Therefore, we apply a class of limited 
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dependent variable models developed by Tobin (1958) that allows the dependent variable to 
be censored at a certain point or value (100% acquisition). 
The cross-section pooled data on acquisitions spans from 2002 to 2007. The 2002 year was 
omitted as the reference year. In the case of this research the cluster option corrects for the 
presence of multiple acquisitions from the same firms by computing standard errors that 
account for clustered data points. The cluster procedure was applied in previous studies by 
Rogers (1993), Williams (2000), and Chari and Chang (2009). 
Description of variables 
The share of equity sought by the UK firm in the deal is our dependent variable, and we 
obtained this information from the Thomson One Banker database. Where other sources of 
data were used for the measures, these are identified along with the description of the 
variables below. 
Level of CB M&A activity in the target country 
We measured the level of CB M&A activity in the target country as the percentage of 
worldwide CB M&As accounted for by CB M&As in the foreign target firm’s country in the 
three years prior to the focal acquisition. We use the three-year average since firms are likely 
to infer pre-emption risks by observing a trend in acquisitions rather than from observations 
in a single year. Larger values of the measure indicate greater pre-emption risk in the target 
firm’s country. We obtained data for the measure from the UNCTAD Cross-Border M&A 
database. 
National cultural distance 
National cultural distance was measured by using the GLOBE practices scores (House et al. 
2004). We measured cultural distance as the extent of the difference or distance between the 
UK and the local firm’s country in terms of GLOBE’s institutional collectivism, in-group 
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collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Like Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
approach, the measure of cultural distance using the uncertainty avoidance dimension was 
calculated as follows.  
𝐶𝐷(𝑈𝐴) =
(UAUK−UA𝑗)
2
𝑉ua
 (2) 
where UAUK is the uncertainty avoidance index for the UK, UAj is the uncertainty avoidance 
index for local firm country j, and Vua is the variance of the uncertainty avoidance index. The 
measure of cultural distance using the institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism and 
power distance dimension was also calculated in a similar fashion. 
We use these cultural distance measures rather than Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index because 
the ‘‘assumption of equivalence’’ across the four cultural dimensions in the aggregated index 
has been characterized as highly problematic, and because the uncertainty avoidance 
dimension has been suggested as potentially the most salient, while the individualism 
dimension has also been noted as important by some (Barkema et al., 1997; Shenkar, 2001: 
525).  
Country risk 
We measured country risk using the Kauffman et al. (2009) index of governance. We added 
the scores of six governance indicators (government effectiveness, political instability, rule of 
law, graft and corruption, voice and accountability, regulatory burden) with greater numbers 
indicating less risk. To be consistent with our hypothesis, we reverse-coded the scores where 
greater scores indicate greater country risk. 
Employment contract rigidity 
We used the employment laws index compiled by Botero et al. (2004) as our measure of 
employment contract rigidity in the local firm’s country. The index for the 85 countries 
surveyed by Botero et al. (2004) ranges in value from a low of 0.15 for Zambia to a high of 
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0.83 for the Russian Federation, with a mean of 0.49. Higher values on the index represent 
greater employment contract rigidity. 
Local firm size 
We measured local firm size as the logarithm (log) of the inflation-adjusted market value of 
the local firm. Since market values for the local firms were not available directly, we 
estimated the market values using the share of equity sought in the acquisition and the 
acquisition value (price offered for the share of equity). Specifically, we calculate the market 
value of the local firm as (acquisition value / share of equity sought) x 100. 
Control variables 
We controlled for the effects of country GDP growth, since prior work, for example by 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), has shown that foreign firms favour the shared ownership 
mode of traditional joint venture over outright acquisition in host countries with higher 
economic growth. We measured GDP growth as the average annual GDP growth in the local 
firm’s country over the 5-year period prior to the acquisition.  
We controlled for differences in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
between the UK and the local firm’s country because GAAP differences complicate target 
firm valuation and may consequently affect the share of ownership sought (Bae, Tan, & 
Welker, 2008). We used Bae et al.’s (2008) measure of GAAP differences, which is based on 
a survey of national accounting rules benchmarked against international accounting 
standards. Finally, since we pool data over a 6-year period, we controlled for the time period 
with a dummy variable for each year, omitting 2002 as the reference year. 
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RESULTS 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the descriptive statistics and correlations between variables 
respectively.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
% of equity sought 0.862 0.282 
Country risk 7.197 3.430 
Institutional collectivism Difference 0.125 0.200 
In-group collectivism Difference 0.539 0.924 
Uncertainty avoidance difference 0.142 0.231 
Power distance 0.128 0.258 
Employment Contract rigidity of target firm 0.442 0.222 
GAAP Differences between target and UK firm 6.545 4.418 
Market value of (target) local firm 312.464 2644.441 
Target country GDP growth 3.280 1.770 
Level of CB M&A activity in the target country 
(%) 
9.252 10.181 
 
Table 4: Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. % of equity sought 1           
2. Country risk -0.01 1          
3. Institutional collectivism 
Difference 
0.01 -0.002 1         
4. In-group collectivism 
Difference 
0.03 -0.74** 0.11 1        
5. Uncertainty avoidance 
difference 
0.00 -0.050 0.36** 0.09 1       
6. Power distance -0.00 0.216** -0.02 -0.06 0.33** 1      
7. Employment Contract 
rigidity of target firm 
0.01 -0.083 0.37** 0.19 0.61** 0.18 1     
8. GAAP Differences 
between target and UK 
firm 
0.01 -0.213** 0.39** 0.30** 0.47** -0.011 0.77** 1    
9. Market value of (target) 
local firm 
0.00 0.011 -0.00 -0.00 0.026 0.06 0.023 -0.00 1   
10. Target country GDP 
growth 
0.02 -0.344** -0.08 0.53** -0.23** -0.11 -0.22** -0.26** -0.02 1  
11. Level of CB M&A 
activity in the target 
country (%) 
-0.03 0.184 -0.32** -0.44** -0.26** -0.15 -0.48** -0.40** -0.01 -0.11 1 
Note: N = 1873; **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; Two-tailed test 
 
24 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the Tobit regression analyses. Model 1 includes only the control 
variables. The model has a significant F value and a log likelihood value of -1376.47. Model 
2 includes only the predictor variables. The model has a significant F statistic, with a log 
likelihood value of -1371.02. Model 3 includes the control variables and predictor variables. 
The model has a significant F statistic, with a log likelihood of -1366.22. 
 
Table 5: Tobit Regression Analyses 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Equity Sought 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient   
Constant 1.989*** 2.007*** 2.068***  
Country Risk 
 
0.009 0.0135  
Level of CBA Activity 
 
-0.005 -0.005  
Cultural Distance – Institutional Collectivism 
 
-0.619** -0.0613**  
Cultural Distance - In-Group Collectivism 
 
0.0009 0.033  
Cultural Distance - Power Distance 
 
-0.028++ -0.032*  
Cultural Distance - Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
-0.038 -0.0437  
Employment Contract Rigidity of Target Firm 
 
0.144 0.242  
Market Value of Target Local Firm 
 
-0.00014*** -0.000014***  
Control variables 
 
   
GAAP differences between Target and UK Firm -0.0081  -0.0132  
Target country GDP growth -0.0152  -0.0518*  
2003 -0.0695  -0.055  
2004 0.0576  0.089  
2005 -0.0626  -0.047  
2006 0.2106  0.229  
2007 0.1335  0.154  
Log Likelihood -1376.47 -1371.02 -1366.22  
F-Statistic Prob 0.4124*** 0.006*** 0.008***  
Pseudo R-Square 0.0026 0.0046 0.0055  
Note: N=1872, being 1438 right censored or full acquisition;  
F-statisitic prob greater that 0.10 implies not a good specified model. 
Standard errors are robust standard errors after adjusting for clustering by acquirer;  
***=1% significance level; **=5% significance level; *=10% significance level; ++ marginal rejection at 10% 
significance level. 
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We calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each predictor (in model 3), with the 
largest VIF of 4.23, which is much lower than the threshold value of 10 that indicates 
multicollinearity problems (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Overall, the data fit the 
model well, and the theoretical variables contribute significantly in explaining variation in the 
share of equity sought. 
As shown in Table 5, the coefficient for country risk is not significant, failing to support 
Hypothesis 1. Also, the coefficient for the variable level of CB M&A activity in the target 
firm’s country is not significant, failing to support Hypothesis 2. 
The coefficients for cultural distance measured using in-group-collectivism and uncertainty 
avoidance, are not significant. The coefficients for cultural distance, measured using 
institutional collectivism and power distance, are significant and negative (p < 0.05 and p < 
0.10, respectively). Therefore, there is a reasonable support for hypothesis 3. 
The coefficient for employment contract rigidity is not significant, therefore, Hypothesis 4 is 
not supported. Local firm size is significant and negative (p<0.01), supporting Hypothesis 5. 
The finding tends to suggest that UK firms will seek a lower share of equity in local firms 
when these firms are larger in size than when they are smaller in size. 
With respect to control variables, the coefficient for GAAP differences is not significant. 
However, the coefficient for GDP differences is significant (p<0.10) and negative, indicating 
that firms seek a higher share of equity in host countries with lower economic growth. This 
finding is in line with previous IB studies using TCE logic, where high economic growth in 
host economies increased their market attractiveness (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Larimo and 
Arslan, 2013). None of the year dummy variables are significant. 
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DISCUSSION 
Although prior research has examined the factors influencing the equity sought in CBM&A 
by US firms (e.g. Chari and Chang, 2009), further research is required examining the factors 
influencing ownership choice in a non-US context, because prior work has found that 
ownership preferences vary between US firms and those from other countries (Erramilli, 
1996). Our paper contributes by examining the factors influencing the ownership choice 
between full and partial acquisition in the context of CBM&As by British firms.  
There are differences between British MNEs and US MNEs in terms of pre-and post-M&A 
management practices. Firstly, according to Calori et al. (1994, p. 373), North American 
cultures differ from British culture in terms of the level of personal efforts of the managers at 
the acquiring firm to ensure that the merger is successful. American managers become more 
personally involved than the British. It seems that this ’hands off’ attitude from the managers 
of the acquiring firm is typically British. Taken together, these results show that British and 
American buyers do differ in some of the control mechanisms they exercise over acquired 
firms, some of these practices being in line with their respective administrative and national 
heritage. Moreover, Angwin and Savill (1997, p.430) reported that the UK was statistically 
significant in rating the importance of strong management as the single most important factor. 
This finding accords with the study by Calori et al. (1994), who compared the cross-border 
acquisition management styles of French, American and UK executives, and found UK 
management to be very 'hands-off'. In contrast, US management style is more “hands-on”.  
Secondly, the study by Duncan and Mtar (2006) explicitly highlighted the cultural differences 
between the UK and US in the context of a cross border acquisition by a British firm. Duncan 
and Mtar (2006, p.404) interviewed several directors who commented that there was a 
general misconception that the UK and US have similar cultures and values. One of the 
biggest disparities expressed between the UK and US, was the presence of the ‘good news’ 
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phenomenon, particularly in the US. A Chief Operating Officer explained that US employees 
were more than eager to broadcast good news, but tended to hold back bad news. Another 
difference highlighted by a former Business Change Director, was that the US employees had 
a very ‘sales and customer orientated approach’, whereas the British employees were much 
more ‘bottom line’ driven. 
We find that British MNEs are more likely to pursue a partial acquisition in a target foreign 
firm when those foreign firms are from culturally distant countries. The findings of our study 
support the argument that challenges with integrating local firm managers in culturally distant 
countries motivate firms to acquire partial equity interest in the target firm instead of 
acquiring the target firm completely (Chi, 1994). Specifically, we find that the institutional 
collectivism and power distance dimensions of national culture have significant impact on the 
ownership choice between full and partial acquisition in the context of British CBM&As. 
Prior literature argues that uncertainty avoidance is a more powerful determinant than other 
dimensions of culture in explaining the ownership choice between partial and full acquisition 
(Chari and Chang, 2009; Contractor et al., 2014). However, we find that uncertainty 
avoidance has no significant impact on the share of equity sought which is inconsistent with 
the findings of Chari and Chang (2009) and Contractor et al. (2014). Our finding tends to 
suggest that a British MNE is more likely to choose a partial acquisition in the foreign target 
firm in the face of high institutional collectivism distance since a firm in a high institutional 
collectivism culture may be reluctant to share resources with the British MNE. This boundary 
could then become a barrier to the knowledge transfer process. By offering a greater 
ownership to the foreign target firm, the British MNE could obtain the target firm’s 
managers’ support in transferring tacit knowledge. Moreover, the British MNE will seek a 
lower share of equity in the foreign target firm in the face of high power distance since higher 
power distance results in a lack of communication and dissimilar decision making practices 
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between acquiring and target firm. A partial acquisition allows the British MNE to share 
power and authority with the target foreign firm, and creates opportunities to engage in early 
and high level communication with the target firm which, in turn, can assist in establishing 
relationships with employees of the target firm. Thus, partial acquisition facilitates the 
transfer of tacit knowledge from the target foreign firm. 
Results for the relationship between local firm size and the share of ownership support the 
view that the high cost of separating desired assets from non-desired assets motivates firms to 
use a share of equity to support exchange rather than acquire the target completely (Das and 
Teng, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). This is due to the greater costs of separating non-desired assets 
for larger target firms.  Likewise, the greater cost of restructuring for large target firms arises 
from the greater numbers of employees and activities to be restructured (Oh et al., 2014; 
Kavadis and Castañer, 2015). Therefore, British firms are more likely to opt out of complete 
acquisitions in favour of partial stakes to support exchange in larger target firms. 
Contrary to our expectation, we find that employment contract rigidity does not affect the 
share of ownership sought. One explanation for this finding is that British firms may not 
perform sufficient due diligence to take post-acquisition restructuring costs into account. If 
so, British firms may complete the acquisition but encounter difficulties in the post-
acquisition phase, resulting in below-expected performance or failures. This explanation is 
consistent with reports of post-acquisition performance difficulties observed in CB M&As 
(Aw and Chatterjee, 2004; Datta and Puia, 1995). 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Our study makes various contributions at both theoretical and empirical levels. First, we 
contribute to the small but growing literature on the level of equity sought or ownership 
decisions in CB M&As. There is limited understanding of why and how acquiring firms 
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decide between levels of ownership in CBM&As (Contractor et al., 2014). So, we make a 
significant addition to the entry mode literature, since the determinants of ownership choice 
between partial and full acquisition in CB M&As have received limited attention in prior 
research.  
Second, we extend the studies by Jakobsen and Meyer (2008) and Arslan and Larimo (2012) 
by approaching aspects of equity share in CBM&As from the novel perspective of real 
options theory (Brouthers and Dikova, 2010) and TCE (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). We 
use both theoretical perspectives to address different aspects of uncertainties associated with 
foreign market entry in relation to ownership choice between partial and full acquisitions in 
CBM&As.  
Third, the findings of our paper reinforce previous management scholarship that has used 
specific cultural dimensions (Morosini et al., 1998) as opposed to an aggregate, multi-factor 
measure of cultural distance (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chakrabarti et al., 2009). Our paper 
contributes by examining the impact of specific cultural dimensions, such as, uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism on ownership 
choice in CBM&A.  
Fourth, prior work has found that ownership preferences vary between US firms and those 
from other countries (Erramilli, 1996). Therefore, further research is required examining the 
factors influencing ownership choice from a non-US context. Unlike Chari and Chang (2009) 
which focused on CBM&As by US MNEs, our paper focuses on British MNEs’ choice 
between full and partial acquisitions.  
Fifth, prior literature argues that uncertainty avoidance is a more powerful determinant than 
other dimensions of culture in explaining the ownership choice between partial and full 
acquisition (Chari and Chang, 2009; Contractor et al., 2014). In contrast, we found that 
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institutional collectivism and power distance have a significant impact on the ownership 
choice between full and partial acquisition in the context of UK CBM&As. 
Sixth, our study is based on CB M&As undertaken by British MNEs globally, including both 
developed and emerging economies. Hence, our study sample is more heterogeneous, and our 
findings are more generalizable.  
The findings of our study have implications for managers of British MNEs aspiring to 
internationalize via CB M&As. The prior literature established theoretically that it is 
important to consider country risk, the level of CBM&A activity in the host economy, 
cultural distance, employment rigidity and the market value of the local firm when analyzing 
the level of equity sought in the foreign acquisition. We suggest that managers give more 
importance to institutional collectivism and power distance dimensions of cultural distance as 
well as the market value of the local firm when deciding on the equity share in the 
acquisition. However, as our sample included both developed and emerging host economies, 
it is important for managers to recognise that different factors may have a different level of 
importance for CB M&As in particular contexts. It is also vital to note that our study 
reinforced the importance of considering uncertainty as a multifaceted variable, rather than a 
single construct. Even though the conceptualization of uncertainty may change, managers 
involved in CB M&As need to examine uncertainty from the perspectives of state, effect and 
response uncertainties, to devise an efficient strategy in a host country. 
As with all studies, this paper has certain limitations which may be addressed in future 
research. We analyze CB M&As undertaken by British MNEs globally at a general level. 
Future studies could offer more fine-grained analysis by dividing the sample based on the 
level of economic development in host economies. This would offer more clearly insights to 
the uncertainty related determinants in both developed and emerging contexts.  
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